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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 





) civil Action 





PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF ON RELIEF ISSUES 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION ON CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
AND OTHER RELIEF ISSUES IS STILL THE LAW OF THE CASE 
Thrice during the relief phase trial of this case the Court 
indicated to the parties that it wanted their briefs to address 
the status of the Court of Appeals' ruling on constructive 
discharge, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73, 
including dissent n.l. See Tr. 10-11, 94-95, 366-367. Y This 
is the key issue at the remedy stage of this case. Assuming 
liability, plaintiff is entitled to relief if she was 
constructively discharged. The law of the case is that she was. 
Plaintiff's position is that the Court of Appeals' decision 
on relief issues was unaffected by the Supreme Court's remand and 
therefore remains the law of the case. Specifically, it is the 
law of the case that 
Price Waterhouse's decision to deny Hopkins 
partnership status, . . . coupled. with the cx:;s' s 
failure to renominate her, would have been viewed. by 
any reasonable senior manager in her :p::>5ition as a 
_y Unless otherwise indicated, transcript references in this 
brief are to the transcript of the relief phase trial held on 
February 28 and March 1, 1990. 
career-ending action. Accordingly, it amounted to a 
constru.ctive discharge. 
Id., 825 F.2d at 473. The Court of Appeals also directed this Court 
to determine the back pay plaintiff was entitled to receive for the 
period between denial of partnership and plaintiff's resignation 
from Price Waterhouse. Id. Moreover, at three different points in 
its opinion, the majorit y - - with Judge Williams' concurrence --
indicated that it viewed an offer of partnership as the appropriate 
prospective relief and a ssumed that this Court would have ordered 
that relief if it had found a constructive discharge. Y 
Procedural Background 
In its "Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En 
Banc" to the Court of Appeals, Price Waterhouse attacked the Court's 
constructive discharge ruling. However, after rehearing was denied, 
the firm did not seek Supreme Court review of that ruling. The 
plurality opinion in the Supreme Court noted that "Price Waterhouse 
does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the refusal 
to repropose [Hopkins] for partnership amounted to a constructive 
y See 825 F.2d at 464: "Having concluded that Hopkins was 
a victim of sexual discrimination, the trial judge went on to 
find that she was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing 
the firm to make her a partner." 
Id. at 464-465: 
both backpay from the 
requiring that she be 
partner." 
"Accordingly, the [trial] court denied her 
date of her resignation and a decree 
invited to join Price Waterhouse as a 
Id. at 472 "With respect to post[r]esignation damages, the 
District Court found that Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that 
she had been constructively discharged and therefore was 
ineligible both for backpay subsequent to the date of her 
resignation and an order directing that she be made a partner." 
(Underscoring added.) 
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discharge." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. 1275, 1281 n.l 
(1989). And in its concluding paragraph and judgment, the plurality 
reversed "the Court of Appeals' judgment against Price Waterhouse on 
liability" and remanded the case to that Court for further 
proceedings. Id. at 1795 (underscoring added). This was the 
judgment in which Justices White and O'Connor concurred. Id. at 
1795, 1796. 
The mandate of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court "for further 
proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this Court." The 
Court of Appeals then vacated its own 1987 mandate, vacated this 
Court's judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for further 
proceedings. Y 
Discussion 
The Supreme Court took pains not to decide, disapprove or even 
discuss the Court of Appeals' ruling on constructive discharge. 
Contrast Johnson v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 457 
U.S. 52 (1982), where the Court vacated a Seventh Circuit judgment 
altogether in order to insure that "the doctrine of the law of the 
case does not constrain either the District Court, or should an 
appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals." Id. at 54-
55. since the mandate of the Supreme Court "is controlling only as 
to matters within its compass on the remand, a lower court is free 
as to other issues." Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 
y We recognize that we earlier mistakenly said the Court of 
Appeals had vacated its 1987 opinion (Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief 
on Remedy at 5). That is not so; only the mandate was vacated. 
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(1979); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 
(1939). While the Court of Appeals vacated its own mandate, its 
opinion on constructive discharge remains the law of the case and 
therefore must be respected by this Court. 
"[T]he law of the case ... when used to express the duty of a 
lower court to follow what has been decided by a higher court at an 
earlier stage of the case applies to everything decided, either 
expressly or by necessary implication." City of Cleveland, Ohio v. 
Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 
quoting Munro v. Post, 102 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1939). While the 
doctrine does not apply to findings that are "integral" to a vacated 
judgment of the higher court, Dorsey v. Continental Cas. Co., 730 
F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1984), it otherwise "invokes the rule that 
findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are 
generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in 
the trial court or in a later appeal." Id. 
In this case the Supreme Court disapproved some of the findings 
and conclusions of the Court of Appeals on liability and reversed 
the appellate court's judgment on liability. But it carefully left 
undisturbed the Court of Appeals' findings and conclusions on 
relief. These findings and conclusions were vacated by neither the 
Supreme court nor the Court of Appeals and remain the law of the 
case if judgment is again entered for plaintiff. 
Moreover, there are strong reasons to foresee that the Court of 
Appeals would adhere to its prior decision on relief and none to 
foresee a different result should this case again be appealed to 
that Court. We now discuss those reasons. 
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1. There Are No New Facts Relating to the Constructive 
Discharge Issue. There has been no new evidence on the constructive 
discharge issue. Therefore, one of the few accepted reasons to 
reconsider a decision that would otherwise be the law of the case, 
namely, that "the evidence in a subsequent trial was substantially 
different," Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 195 (D.C.Cir.), 
quoting White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-432 (5th Cir. 1967), is 
inapplicable here. 
2. The Court of Appeals Declined Rehearing on This Issue and 
There Is No Intervening Controlling Authority to the Contrary. A 
future application to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the 
constructive discharge would be no more than an out-of-time request 
for a second rehearing, with no intervening change in the law to 
justify such an action. Our Court of Appeals has strongly 
disapproved the use of subsequent appeals to reargue its earlier 
rulings: 
Moreover, we take this opportunity to emphasize that 
this court will not, absent truly "exceptional 
ci.rct.nnstances," I.affey II, 642 F.2d at 585, look 
favorably on arguments against the law of the case 
which fall only under the "manifest injustice" 
rubric. We do not intend to allow this avenue of 
attack on the law of the case to become an auxiliary 
vehicle for the repetition of arguments previously 
advanced, without success, in appellate briefs, 
petitions for rehearing, arxi petitions for certiorari. 
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Laffey III), 740 F.2d 1071, 
1082-1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted). Compare Johnson 
v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412, 416 
(D.C.Cir. 1986), disapproving invocation of the Court's inherent 
power to recall its mandate at any time, for good cause, as a 
means to grant a "late rehearing." 
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Indeed, the Court of Appeals' adherence to the law of the 
case in subsequent appeals has been so strong that it has even 
refused to disturb earlier rulings which it recognized were 
erroneous. See Webster v. Sun Co. Inc., 790 F.2d 157, 161 
(D.C.Cir. 1986); and Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc. (Laffey 
II), 642 F.2d 578, where the Court recognized that its earlier 
interpretation of the Equal Pay Act in Laffey I, 567 F.2d 429 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), was in 
error. Nonetheless, in Laffey II the Court declined to 
reconsider that interpretation: 
An appellate court also is nonnally bound by the law 
of the case it established on a prior appeal, and for 
a very sound reason. If justice is to be served, 
there must at some point be an end to litigation; on 
that account, the power to recall mandates should be 
exercised sparingly. To warrant divergence from the 
law of the case, a court must not only be convinced 
that its earlier decision was erroneous, it must also 
be satisfied that adherence to the law of the case 
will work a grave injustice. In the litigation before 
us, we perceive no exceptional circumstances which 
would justify overriding the stron::r policy of repose 
nonnally accorded past decisions. OUr prior 
inter:pretation of the F.qual Pay Act admittedly was 
overinclusive - a defect that for posterity we later 
cure in this opinion -- but that is as much as can be 
said. If error without more sufficed to render a 
decision forever vulnerable to reopening, the law of 
the case doctrine would lose all meaning. Here, as in 
another context the First Circuit once said, "we 
believe it would be far greater error to pennit 
reconsideration naw after denial of petitions for 
rehearing and certiorari. '!here must be an end to 
dispute." 
Laffey II, 642 F.2d at 585 (footnotes omitted). 
3. The Constructive Discharge Decision Was In Line With 
Prior Case Law In This Circuit. It is a reasonable inference 
that the Court of Appeals declined to rehear en bane the panel's 
unanimous constructive discharge decision in this case because 
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that decision was in line with its prior decision in Clark v. 
Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir. 1981). The Court of Appeals in 
this case merely applied the principles of Clark v. Marsh to a 
specialized situation, i.e., the all-but-final rejection for 
partner of a "partner track" employee in a professional firm 
where the customary practice in such situations was for the 
employee t o leave, the classic "up or out." The career path here 
was relatively unique, although in reality hardly different from 
the practice of enforced departure presented in Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). Moreover, apart from the fact that 
departure after rejection is inherent in this professional 
setting, plaintiff had also made known from the outset that her 
eligibility to become a partner was an "absolute prerequisite" 
for her joining Price Waterhouse. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 
825 F.2d at 472. 
Defendant's practice means that a decision not to propose or 
consider a professional employee for partner is likely to be 
career-ending in two senses. First, almost by definition there 
are no prospects for becoming a partner. Second, if the employee 
ignores the custom and stays on, a likely result is that firm 
members will resent this break with past practice and the 
employee's work situation will actually deteriorate. 
There is no reason to think that appellate reexamination of 
the constructive discharge decision in this case would occur or, 
if it did, would lead to a different result. Hence it must be 
accepted as fact that plaintiff's departure from Price Waterhouse 
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was a constructive discharge, and that plaintiff is therefore 
entitled to relief. 
II. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO PARTNERSHIP ii 
Assuming liability, plaintiff is due full relief. Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Lander v. Lujan, 888 
F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
The most serious discretionary issue on relief is whether 
plaintiff should be admitted to partnership. We believe that she 
should be. First, lesser relief would not only be incomplete; it 
would also be doomed to fail. Thus, although defendant has 
suggested that it would be sufficient to give plaintiff a new, 
fair opportunity for consideration, Mr. Connor's testimony made 
it clear that the die would be cast against her, as the Court 
noted at trial [Tr. 329-30). Second, defendant has simply not 
shown how plaintiff's entry into a large firm, in which her 
particular specialty is booming, would cause any specific 
problems or disruption. Certainly some partners would be 
initially unhappy, but a "discrimination remedy cannot turn on 
the employer's preferences." Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d at 
158. And there is nothing in the record to suggest that any 
partners could not work professionally with plaintiff, or she 
with them. 
Admission to partnership should be the presumptive remedy in 
this case. See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 817 
ii Many of the issues herein are addressed in more detail in 
plaintiff's pretrial briefs. 
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F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 785 
(1988) (observing that "reinstatement is the preferred remedy" in 
ADEA cases). Defendant has not shown why plaintiff's admission 
as a partner would be inappropriate. She should be admitted. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to back pay. Dr. Tryon's 
computation is reasonable, especially as it is grounded largely 
on stipulated facts [Pl.Ex. Al4-Al5]. We agree that plaintiff 
had a duty to mitigate after she left Price Waterhouse. She did 
so. The burden is on defendant to prove inadequate mitigation, 
see Floca v. Homcare Health Services, 845 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 
1988), and defendant has not done so here. See Proposed Finding 
5. As a legal matter, it is reasonable for someone to mitigate 
by setting up her own business, Carden v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir. 1988), and as a practical 
matter this was a recognized avenue for former Price Waterhouse 
employees. See Proposed Finding 5(b). Moreover, defendant has 
not shown that plaintiff could have become a partner in another 
Big 8 firm, and no other type of firm was identified having 
compensation even approaching that possible at Price 
Waterhouse. See Proposed Finding 5(c). 
In fact, it is highly unlikely that plaintiff could have 
become a partner elsewhere. Price Waterhouse itself has never 
admitted as a partner someone who had been turned down by another 
Big 8 firm, and of the more than 100 candidates rejected by 
defendant for partnership from 1980 to 1987, only 4 later became 
partners at other Big 8 firms. For plaintiff, who had filed a 
suit against Price Waterhouse that received some publicity, the 
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odds would have been still longer. See Brewster v. Martin 
Marietta, 47 FEP 1276, 1282 (Mich. 1985) (one of factors making it 
unlikely for plaintiff to secure comparable employment was that 
it was "probably well known that she had filed a sex 
discrimination suit against her former employers"). See Proposed 
Finding 5(d). Ultimately, of course, plaintiff got a job at the 
World Bank paying more than $90,000 annually. This is an 
excellent position by any standard, and defendant has not shown 
that she could have done better. 
Although there was much testimony on front pay, such 
compensation becomes an issue only if the Court declines to order 
defendant to invite plaintiff to become a partner. In that 
event, full relief requires that she be given monetary relief in 
lieu of partnership. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 
F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d Cir. 1984). Dr. Tryon's testimony on front 
pay was not seriously challenged. See Proposed Finding 6. There 
are uncertainties, of course, but these are inevitable any time 
future losses are projected. They certainly do not provide a 
basis for withholding relief. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. 
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 546 (1983). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) ("[t]he most elementary 
conceptions of justice and public policy require that the 




III. PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED DECREE IS REASONABLE 
AND IS NOT INTRUSIVE 
The proposed decree is short and straightforward. The first 
five paragraphs provide that plaintiff is to be extended an offer 
of partnership effective July 1, 1990 
scheduled admission date for partners 
the next regularly 
that back pay as 
computed by Dr. Tryon will be awarded, that plaintiff will be 
treated for all purposes as if she had been admitted on July 1, 
1983, and that she will not be subjected to retaliation. 
Initially plaintiff will receive the average compensation given 
consulting partners in her class; thereafter her shares will be 
adjusted on the same basis as is done for other partners. 
Paragraphs 6-9 address the issue of preventing sexual 
stereotyping from affecting the partnership admissions process. 
These provisions are designed to be minimally intrusive, to be 
largely self-policing and to build on what Price Waterhouse says 
it has already been doing since this Court's first decision in 
1985. These provisions are being submitted in accordance with 
the Court's instructions at the close of the recent trial [Tr. 
365-66]. 
Paragraph 6 is a general injunction. Paragraph 7 requires 
defendant to adopt a written policy barring sex discrimination in 
the admissions process and, in particular, cautioning against 
stereotyping. Mr. Connor's testimony suggests that Price 
Waterhouse may already have taken some steps in this regard [Tr. 
254-55]. Paragraph 7 also requires, however, that defendant's 
policy provide that partners who act on stereotypes (or otherwise 
discriminate) may suffer reduction of future share allocations. 
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This is in line with Susan Fiske's testimony that incentives are 
needed to prevent stereotyping (Original Trial, March 28, 1985, 
transcript at 620-21]. 
Paragraph 8 requires the Policy Board to screen all comments 
made about women candidates, to look into those that may be 
reflective of stereotyping, and to discard such comments (as well 
as all negative remarks made by the same partner) unless it is 
clear that the comments were not the product of stereotyping. 
Again, it appears from Mr. Connor's testimony that Price 
Waterhouse has always undertaken a screening process along the 
lines proposed [Tr. 255]. 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 are intended to work in tandem -- the 
former to discourage stereotyping in the first instance, the 
latter to weed out any stereotyping that still manages to creep 
into the process. These provisions are self-policing and simply 
build on defendant's own initiatives. The one new feature is to 
add the possibility of discipline for partners who act on 
stereotypes or otherwise discriminate. This possibility alone 
may be sufficient to prevent stereotyping from affecting the 
admissions process. 
Paragraph 9 requires defendant to maintain records relating 
to partnership admissions for five years. We are not proposing 
that any reports be filed with the Court, but we believe the 





Paragraph 10 relates to attorneys' fees and requires the 
parties to follow Local Rule 215. As noted in an earlier 
pleading, the parties hope it will be possible to resolve all fee 
issues without resort to the Court. In any event, Paragraph 10 
requires the parties to report on the status of fee discussions 
within 30 days of the date of the decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed decree gives plaintiff full relief but does not 




KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER 
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 950 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 898-4800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Certificate of Service 
On March 30 , 1990 plaintiff's proposed findings of fact on 
relief, proposed decree and supporting brief were delivered to: 
Theodore B. Olson 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
